Badly looking for a political win that would both fulfil some campaign promises to his political base and
satisfy the demands of rank-and-file Republicans in Congress, President Trump has signed an expansive energy Independence and economic Growth executive Order. The executive order signals a sharp shift in federal climate change rules, stand- ards and work procedures. This was expected based on Trump’s cam- paign rhetoric and his selection of Cabinet members and advisers. But as with other Trump White House initiatives, it is unclear how much change the administration can deliv- er and at what pace.
It took a long time for the Obama administration to formulate some of the central climate change rules now targeted by the Trump administra- tion, and it will take years trying to change them.
The signing of the executive order is just the administration’s opening salvo in what is destined to become a protracted and high-stakes battle.
The Trump attack
Cloaked in unsubstantiated “pro- growth” rhetoric, the executive order targets the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan. It also focuses on mandates to cap methane emissions, looks to increase support for the extraction and use of coal and other fossil fuels, and changes the ways in which climate change concerns are
embedded in actions by federal agen- cies (including taking into consider- ation the social cost of carbon). The Clean Power Plan was designed to curb carbon dioxide emissions from existing coal-fired power plants as well as to promote renewable energy production and greater energy effi- ciency. The Obama administration also set emissions standards for new power plants. These and other mea- sures were issued in response to the unwillingness by the u.S. Congress to pass any separate climate change legislation.
Announced in August 2015, the Clean Power Plan was immediately challenged in court by a group of
29 states and state agencies with the support of a variety of firms and industry organizations, includ- ing Oklahoma while current ePA Administrator Scott Pruitt was the state’s attorney general. The oppo- nents argued the ePA had over- stepped its regulatory authority with the new rules and they therefore should be struck down.
The Supreme Court in an unprecedented decision in February 2016 ordered the ePA to temporar- ily stay the implementation of the Clean Power Plan until a lower-level court had made a ruling on the ePA’s authority to set such stan- dards. Oral hearings were held in the D.C. Circuit Court in September 2016, but a decision is still pending. Coal miners were visible sup- porters of Trump during the presi- dential campaign and at the signing of a sweeping executive order to reverse regulations to limit green house gases. Because the ePA under Pruitt will review the Clean Power Plan and roll back other Obama initiatives, the executive order alters basic legal dynamics. now, lawsuits making their way up the court sys- tem will change. Instead of challeng- ing the Obama rules, suits will be aimed at forcing the Trump adminis- tration to either uphold them or take other forms of meaningful regulatory action.
Many states and environmental groups that support the Clean Power Plan and other existing measures stand ready with a line-up of lawyers to fight back. They will argue that the federal government must act based on a 2007 u.S. Supreme Court decision classifying CO2 as a pollut- ant under the Clean Air Act and a 2009 ePA endangerment Finding stating that current and projected atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases threaten the public health and welfare of current and future generations.
Will we still always have Paris? The executive order is silent on the Trump administration’s intent vis- à-vis the 2015 Paris Agreement, in which nearly 200 countries agreed to lower greenhouse gas emissions. But it casts a long shadow both on the u.S. ability to meet its Paris goal and the future of u.S. international leadership on climate change. The implementation of the Clean Power Plan is central to fulfilling u.S. com- mitments under the Paris Agreement of reducing national GHG emissions by 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28 percent. By 2014, national emissions were down 9 percent compared with 2005 levels.
The ePA Clean Power Plan was a linchpin in the u.S. global climate commitments because it restricted carbon emissions from power plants, directly affecting coal-fired plants. electing to either leave or ignore the Paris Agreement would not provide the united States with more inde- pendence and flexibility, as it reduc- es its political influence and ability to shape future decisions in global climate negotiations.
There are other global environ- mental treaties around biodiversity protection and the management of hazardous chemicals and wastes to which the united States is not a party. As a result, the u.S. abili- ty to influence regulatory decisions under these treaties is severely lim- ited – for example, specific chemical compounds where there is a need to protect human health and the envi- ronment, or where u.S. firms have economic interests.
This foreshadows the kind of outsider status that the united States may gain if it backs out of the Paris Agreement.
notably, ceding international leadership on climate change may serve only to embolden other coun- tries, including China, to take on a more prominent role at the expense of u.S. influence. It would also fur- ther increase many other countries’ rapidly mounting frustration with the Trump administration.
Many different stakeholders, including exxonMobil, argue that it is better for the united States to be on the inside rather than the outside when it comes to the future climate change cooperation. Former exxonMobil CeO and cur- rent Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has suggested the u.S. should stay in the agreement.
US paying for assistance or ammunition?
even if the united States stays with the Paris Agreement, President Trump and Republicans in Congress have made it clear they want to severely limit, or completely cut off, u.S. contributions to climate finance in support of mitigation and adaptation measures in developing countries. The united States so far
has provided uS$1 billion of the
$3 billion pledged by the Obama administration to the Green Climate Fund. Carrying through on these statements by significantly reducing
u.S. international assistance would effectively erode an important basis of u.S. political leadership and influ- ence. But they appear to be part of a larger shift in the use of foreign policy instruments from nonmili- tary means, such as climate and development aid, to military ones. Trump’s “skinny budget” proposed a 31 percent cut to the ePA budget and a 29 percent reduction in funds for the State Department and other development programs.
There is very little chance that Congress will approve such dramat- ic cuts, but these proposals tie in with what seems to be a broader change in u.S. foreign policy strate- gy. As Trump proposed a 10 percent increase in the military budget, for- eign policy experts worry that a sig- nificant cut in nonmilitary resources will severely undermine u.S. lead- ership and the ability by the State Department and other government agencies to promote u.S. interest and political stability.
The court of public opinion
As the battle over federal climate change policy continues, President Trump risks losing the public opin- ion battle on climate change beyond his most ardent base. A recent poll shows that 75 percent of Americans believe that carbon dioxide should be regulated as a pollutant and that 69 percent believe that there should be limits on emissions from existing coal-fired power plants. If such polling numbers remain strong, the Trump administration will be fighting an uphill battle in both courtrooms and the public sphere.
The author, Henrik Selin, is Associate Professor in the Frederick S Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston Universit